By Lucy Caulkett-
The employment judge who escaped both dismissal and legal action, despite what the Judicial Conduct Investigations office(JCIO) described as credible allegations, raises serious questions of accountability for the judicial system.
The description of Christopher Gaskell’s conduct was remarkably close to the legal definition of sexual harassment under the Equality Act, but regulators of the judicial system basically announced to the world that he escaped accountability because he voluntarily resigned before he could have been dismissed. had his same conduct been committed by any other professional, they would must likely have been charged to appear before a Magistrates Court judge
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But judges who are meant to protect the public for the sake of justice, appear to be shielded from facing justice, when they fall foul of the law. It raises serious questions about the integrity of the system, and the extent to which some of these judges can be trusted to give rulings without sexual prejudice or ulterior motives linked to the kind of arrogance and feeling of immunity many judges probably have,
Section 26 of the Equality Act 2010 defines sexual harassment as unwanted conduct of a sexual nature which has the purpose or effect of violating a person’s dignity, or creating an intimidating, hostile, degrading, humiliating or offensive environment. The legislation is deliberately broad: sexual harassment can be verbal, physical or non-verbal.
And inappropriate touching is explicitly recognised as a possible form of sexual harassment, making the case of former Employment Judge Christopher Gaskell particularly uncomfortable. A Judicial Conduct Investigations Office investigation found that Gaskell had inappropriately touched a junior female member of tribunal staff and engaged in sexualised behaviour towards women working at the tribunal.
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The investigating judge concluded that the conduct constituted gross misconduct, involved an abuse of his position and authority, caused distress and emotional harm, created a risk of further harm and was incompatible with the standards expected of a judicial office holder. The conclusion was stark. He should have been removed from judicial office.
Gaskell retired on 1 March 2026 before the disciplinary process was completed, and was therefore not formally dismissed. Instead, the Lord Chancellor and Lady Chief Justice confirmed that had he still been a serving judge, he would have been removed from office. That distinction matters legally.
But from the perspective of the women involved, the more striking question is arguably this. Why did behaviour that bears such a striking resemblance to conduct prohibited in ordinary workplaces have to pass through the specialist machinery of judicial discipline before the system concluded that it was unacceptable.
The striking parallel with sexual-harassment law
There is an almost uncomfortable symmetry between the allegations against Gaskell and the wording of the law he would have applied in employment cases.
Sexual harassment does not require a perpetrator to announce a sexual motive. Under section 26, the conduct can qualify because of its nature and its effect on the recipient. The law recognises that behaviour can violate dignity or create an offensive or humiliating environment even where the perpetrator insists that he was joking, being friendly or did not intend to cause offence.
The Law Society’s guidance similarly lists inappropriate touching, sexual jokes, unwelcome sexual advances and other physical or verbal conduct among behaviour capable of constituting sexual harassment That is why the Gaskell case is so striking.
The judicial investigation was not simply concerned with an isolated awkward interaction. It examined conduct towards several female members of staff and concluded that the behaviour was unwanted, sexual in nature and involved an abuse of authority.
In any conventional employment setting, those are precisely the circumstances in which an employer would be expected to investigate a sexual-harassment complaint. Depending on the evidence and the precise legal circumstances, the consequences could include an employment tribunal claim, disciplinary action and potentially dismissal for gross misconduct.
There is another important distinction. Sexual harassment under the Equality Act is not, by itself, a criminal offence. It would therefore be inaccurate to say that Gaskell would automatically have been “charged with sexual harassment” had he been in another profession.
But if particular touching had crossed the criminal threshold, separate offences such as sexual assault could potentially arise. And since April 2026, England and Wales have also had a new criminal offence covering intentional harassment motivated by a person’s sex in specified circumstances. The legal route would depend entirely on the facts. The broader point remains: the same behaviour can have very serious consequences outside the judiciary.
Judicial independence is fundamental to the rule of law, and the government does not interfere with the rulings of judges. However, independence from political interference is not supposed to mean independence from accountability.
The JCIO exists precisely because judges are subject to disciplinary standards. It describes misconduct as personal misbehaviour serious enough to require formal disciplinary action against judicial office holders. Whether judges should have special protections is beyond dispute, but when those protections make it harder for people who work around judges to challenge inappropriate behaviour, and for the system to act when appropriate and necessary, it becomes a glaring concern.
A concern women of all professions, in particular, should take seriously. Exceptional treatment cannot be made for those in the highest office, otherwise the judgement and credibility of the system that governs them must be deemed very weak.
That concern has been raised by professionals working within the legal system.Baroness Harriet Harman’s independent review into bullying, harassment and sexual harassment at the Bar found significant concerns about the consequences of complaining about judges.
Baroness Harriet spoke against a culture of impunity for those at the top who commit misconduct, adding that judges in senior positions are confident that nothing will be done about their behaviour, later referring to a ‘culture of silence’ along the corridors of the judicial system.
Barristers reported fears that raising allegations could affect their careers or their cases, creating a power imbalance in which the person making the complaint could have considerably more to lose. Barrister Tana Adkin KC has similarly argued that the judicial complaints process needs reform, asking whether the system is fit for purpose, if women are reluctant to use it to report bullying and harassment by judges.
That is an important warning because a complaints system cannot be judged solely by the number of complaints it receives. A low number may indicate a healthy professional culture. But it may also indicate that people do not believe complaining is safe, worthwhile or likely to produce a meaningful outcome.
The Gaskell allegations are particularly serious because of the status of the people involved. A judge is not merely another employee. Judges possess institutional authority. Their decisions can affect people’s careers, finances, family lives and reputations. Within a tribunal environment, staff also know that the judge is part of the hierarchy of the institution in which they work. That imbalance is precisely why the JCIO investigation regarded Gaskell’s position as significant.
The finding was that his behaviour involved an abuse of position and authority, caused distress and emotional harm and created a risk of further harm. The words “abuse of position” should not be overlooked. They go to the heart of the problem. Someone who behaves inappropriately towards a colleague is one thing. A person who does so while occupying a position of considerable institutional authority presents a different risk.
And the more junior the recipient, the greater the potential difficulty in saying no.Nor is this an isolated example of judicial disciplinary action involving inappropriate behaviour towards staff.In June 2026, District Judge Andrew Simpson was removed from office after an investigation into his conduct towards court staff.
The case involved unwanted physical contact, overly familiar communications, inappropriate remarks and the sending of a “highly sexualised image”. The investigation found that he had abused his position by failing to recognise the power imbalance between himself and court employees. The case is particularly revealing because the disciplinary panel initially recommended a reprimand.
The Lord Chancellor and Lady Chief Justice ultimately disagreed and removed Simpson, concluding that the conduct was repeated, involved an abuse of his position, caused distress to staff and damaged the reputation of the judicial system.
There was also the 2024 case involving High Court judge Marcus Smith, who was reprimanded after giving a junior member of staff a handwritten love letter expressing his feelings for her. That case demonstrated another of complaints about judicial office holders in recent years, although only a small proportion progress to formal disciplinary sanctions.
Its published disciplinary decisions show that removal remains a relatively rare sanction — as problem at the boundary between personal conduct and professional authority. These cases do not establish that judicial misconduct of this type is widespread. Nor is there a reliable official historical series showing how many judges have specifically been removed for sexual harassment. But they demonstrate that the problem is real.
And the recent statistics are revealing in a broader sense. The JCIO received thousands of complaints about judicial office holders in recent years, although only a small proportion progress to formal disciplinary sanctions. Its published disciplinary decisions show that removal remains a relatively rare sanction — as it should be when judicial independence is at stake.
The JCIO’s latest annual report, published in January 2026, shows that of 3,279 complaints received by the JCIO from April 2024 to March 2025, 2,718 (83%) were rejected because they did not meet the criteria for assessment and 57 complaints were rejected for being out of time.
Only 89 complaints were upheld (2.7%). Of 36 complaints categorised as ‘bullying and/or harassment’ only 2 were upheld. Of 118 complaints for ‘displaying anger or aggression’ 6 were upheld and out of 227 complaints of ‘rudeness’, 8 were upheld.
The difficulty is making sure that “rare” does not become synonymous with “difficult to achieve”.That is the uncomfortable question the Gaskell case inevitably raises. Imagine a senior manager accused of repeatedly touching junior female employees, using sexualised language and behaving in a manner that causes distress.
If the allegations were substantiated, the conduct could amount to sexual harassment under the Equality Act, and potentially gross misconduct under the employer’s disciplinary policy. There would be no constitutional argument that his seniority entitled him to behave differently.
Judges have a different route to accountability because their office is protected by constitutional principles. That difference is justified when the issue is a judge’s decision, but much harder to justify when it relates to how that judge treats the people who work beneath him.
Judicial independence should mean that judges are free to decide cases without fear or favour, but it should not mean that junior staff have to tolerate conduct they would be legally entitled to challenge if the same behaviour came from an ordinary manager.
The real test is confidence
But the fact that the decision came after the judge’s retirement inevitably leaves an awkward question hanging over the case. For the women involved, the relevant issue was never simply whether Christopher Gaskell retained his judicial title.
It was whether the institution in which they worked was prepared to recognise inappropriate sexual behaviour, take complaints seriously and protect people who were less powerful than the person being accused. That is the standard against which the judiciary should judge itself.
The courts rightly expect employers across Britain to take sexual harassment seriously. Employment judges, more than most people, understand the consequences of failing to do so.The public should therefore expect exactly the same standard inside the judicial system itself.Judicial independence is a protection for justice. It should never become a protection from justice.
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