By Tony O’Reilly-
A former Greater Manchester Police officer who used confidential police intelligence to help her drug dealer boyfriend evade detection has been jailed for three years, in a case that highlights the serious consequences faced by police personnel who abuse privileged access to sensitive information.
PC Tubah Hamid, 25,(pictured) was sentenced at Liverpool Crown Court after being convicted of three counts of misconduct in public office, four counts of computer misuse and an offence relating to the illegal transmission of communications from a prison.
AD: Capeesh Restaurant
The Independent Office for Police Conduct said Hamid had formed a relationship with a man involved in the supply of Class A drugs and used information available to her through policing systems to help him avoid police surveillance.
The offences took place while Hamid was serving with Greater Manchester Police. Between December 2021 and June 2022, she shared confidential intelligence without lawful justification, effectively turning information entrusted to her for policing purposes into a resource that could be used by someone connected to criminal activity.
The investigation also found that Hamid used police computer systems to search for four people between October 2021 and March 2022, without an apparent legitimate policing purpose. At least two of those individuals were subsequently contacted by her. The unauthorised searches became part of the evidence demonstrating how her access to police systems had been misused.
AD: Oysterian Sea Food Restaurant And Bar
The investigation uncovered further evidence of the relationship between Hamid and the criminal network. While under investigation, she was observed travelling in a car with her boyfriend, despite having told Greater Manchester Police that she was off sick and unable to work.
The vehicle was subsequently approached by another man from whom officers later recovered cocaine. Investigators also recovered messages showing that Hamid’s associate was worried that he was being watched by police.
According to the IOPC, Hamid responded by helping him understand how to detect surveillance, including changing his routes. The evidence therefore went beyond an isolated misuse of a database: prosecutors established that confidential police knowledge had allegedly been used in a way that could assist someone attempting to evade law enforcement.
Hamid was sentenced to three years in prison for the misconduct in public office offences. She received additional four-month sentences for computer misuse and the prison communications offence, but those sentences were ordered to run concurrently with the three-year term. Her conviction followed a directed investigation by the IOPC’s Anti-Corruption Unit, carried out by Greater Manchester Police’s Anti-Corruption Unit under the watchdog’s direction.
The case is significant because it comes amid a series of recent prosecutions involving police officers and staff accused or convicted of abusing access to police information or using their positions to facilitate criminal activity.
One of the most serious recent examples involved former Metropolitan Police officer Neil Sinclair, who was sentenced to nine years in prison in October 2025. Sinclair had unlawfully accessed police systems and disclosed sensitive information to members of an organised crime group.
According to the IOPC, he also facilitated the transfer of more than £1.5 million from the United Kingdom to the United Arab Emirates and subsequently helped move more than £3.5 million within the UK. He pleaded guilty to misconduct in public office and offences relating to criminal property.
Another relevant case involved former Thames Valley Police call handler Catherine Arrol, who was sentenced to 34 months in prison in September 2024 after admitting offences connected to participation in the activities of an organised crime group and misconduct in public office. The IOPC said she had accessed police computer systems and classified material without a policing purpose and shared information with another party
More recently, in May 2026, former Cumbria Constabulary civilian investigator Barry Cowin was jailed for four months after admitting seven offences involving the unlawful access and sharing of sensitive police information. The IOPC said he had used his position to obtain information about people he knew, including financial and criminal records.
There have also been several cases in 2026 demonstrating that misuse of police information is not confined to one force or one type of employee. Two former Derbyshire Constabulary call handlers, Ellie-Mae Doherty and Jessica Fitzhugh, were sentenced in September after separate offences involving police information. Doherty received 11 months for passing sensitive information to a man linked to criminal activity, while Fitzhugh was sentenced to four months for unauthorised access to police information and photographing material from police systems.
The wider figures show how much misconduct is being dealt with across policing, although they must not be confused with prison figures. Home Office statistics show that 1,687 individual police officers in England and Wales were referred to formal misconduct proceedings in cases finalised in the year ending March 2025. Of those, 790 were found to have committed gross misconduct and another 579 were found to have committed misconduct.
A total of 424 officers faced accelerated hearings. The Home Office makes clear that criminal proceedings and misconduct proceedings are separate processes, with different legal tests and purposes.
Within the past two years alone, cases involving Hamid, Sinclair, Catherine Arrol, Barry Cowin and other police personnel have resulted in custodial sentences for conduct involving corruption, unauthorised access to police systems, disclosure of sensitive information or links to criminal activity. The cases differ significantly in seriousness and circumstances, so they should not be treated as a single statistical category.
The pattern nevertheless raises a fundamental question about the security of information held by the police, and the vetting processes that allow bent officers into the force. Officers and staff have access to intelligence that can reveal the identities of suspects, witnesses, victims, surveillance operations and investigations. When that information is accessed without a legitimate policing purpose or passed to people outside the service, the potential consequences extend beyond a breach of internal rules.
The danger is particularly acute when the police officer is connected to organised crime. Intelligence about police surveillance, investigations or individuals known to law enforcement can potentially allow criminals to change their behaviour, alter travel patterns, identify investigative activity or interfere with police operations. In one case, a sergeant was jailed after seeking sexually explicit videos from the seized phone of a female suspect
That is why unauthorised access to police databases is treated as a serious integrity issue rather than simply an administrative breach. The IOPC has repeatedly emphasised the trust placed in police officers and staff who have access to sensitive information. Its own learning material includes a case study involving a serving police officer who shared confidential information concerning an organised crime investigation with a partner.
The watchdog has used such cases to underline the importance of monitoring access to police systems and identifying inappropriate use of sensitive information.
For Greater Manchester Police, the Hamid case represents another serious test of the force’s anti-corruption safeguards. The fact that the investigation was referred by GMP and directed by the IOPC’s Anti-Corruption Unit also demonstrates the role of independent oversight when allegations concern the potential abuse of police powers.
IOPC Director of Engagement Amanda Rowe described Hamid’s conduct as a betrayal of public trust and said the case demonstrated that officers who abuse their position to assist criminal activity can face serious consequences.
The significance of the case ultimately goes beyond the three-year sentence imposed on one former officer. Police databases are powerful investigative tools, but that power depends on officers using information only for legitimate policing purposes.
When confidential intelligence is instead placed at the disposal of criminal associates, the breach is not merely of a database rule. It strikes at one of the central expectations on which public confidence in policing depends: that information entrusted to the police will be protected and used to uphold the law, not to help those seeking to evade it.
AD: Heritage And Restaurant Lounge Bar