By Ben Kerrigan-
Nigel Farage has admitted that reform candidates have in the past been subjected to poor vetting procedures, adding he was “enormously angry” about mistakes in vetting in the past, but vowed it will improve for future elections.
Reform has struggled with questions over its candidates and elected officials in recent years, including former Welsh leader Nathan Gill, who admitted taking bribes in return for making pro-Russian statements and is now serving a 10-and-a-half-year prison sentence.
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Mr Farage has previously said he “can’t apologise” for the lack of vetting of the party’s 2024 candidates, but was forthright at a press conference in Scotland on Thursday.
Asked if vetting processes had been insufficient, Mr Farage said: “Yeah, piss poor.
“Piss poor. Sorry it’s crude but it’s been piss poor in the past and it won’t be in the future.
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“Nothing angers me more than all the work that I put in for this, seven days a week, being let down by people who haven’t told us the truth and we, frankly, haven’t put enough effort in or professionalism in to find out the truth about them.
“So yes, I’m enormously angry that many times over the years I’ve been thrown into political crises through no fault of my own.
“If it’s my own fault, I can live with it, I can own it, but with things like this, it’s not good enough.
Farage claimed the party paid £144,000 to a professional firm, Vetting.com, which he says failed to perform the work. He alleged the firm’s chair had past links to the Conservative Party, leading him to claim Reform was “stitched up politically”.
Farage stated the “earlier-than-expected” timing of the 2024 General Election made it “impossible” to conduct full vetting on hundreds of candidates in such a short window.
Scale of the Task: Farage admitted he “had no idea how bad it was” and that many candidates simply hadn’t been vetted at all.
The lack of vetting led to numerous scandals, including candidates who made racist comments or suggested the UK should have remained neutral in WWII.
“Hardcore” Vetting for 2025/2026:
In response, Farage pledged to “professionalize” the party for local and future elections. By late 2024, party insiders reported a “hardcore” vetting process that was reportedly rejecting 50% of applicants to ensure higher candidate quality for the 2025 and 2026 cycles.
In July 2025, Farage stated that the new vetting process for the May 2025 local elections had resulted in “very few issues” among their 1,630 candidates.
Reform movements are born of frustration. They thrive on the sense that the system is broken, that elites are insulated from consequence and that only a clean break can restore trust. Voters drawn to reform banners are not looking for polish; they are looking for honesty, competence and conviction. Yet, time and time again, reform movements have stumbled over the self-inflicted obstacle.
It is a paradox as old as insurgent politics itself. Movements that promise higher standards often fail to apply them internally. In the rush to capitalise on momentum, to fill ballot papers, and to project national reach, vetting becomes a box-ticking exercise rather than a serious safeguard. The consequences are predictable, avoidable, and deeply damaging. The warning signs have been visible for years.
Across multiple election cycles and jurisdictions, reform-labelled candidates have been exposed after selection for past offensive remarks, questionable business dealings, extreme views, or simple unsuitability for public office.
These revelations rarely come from hostile media investigations alone; more often, they emerge from social media archives, local reporting, or the basic scrutiny that accompanies electoral competition. The question is not why opponents find these issues, but why internal processes did not.
At its core, vetting is not about ideological purity. It is about credibility.
A reform movement that claims to challenge a broken political culture cannot afford candidates who embody the very behaviours voters are rejecting. When such candidates slip through, it suggests either negligence or indifference—neither of which inspires confidence.
One explanation lies in speed. Reform movements often grow faster than their organisational capacity.
Membership surges, polling spikes, and suddenly there is pressure to stand candidates in every possible seat. Local branches, sometimes newly formed, are tasked with finding representatives at short notice. Background checks are rushed. References are thin. Red flags are ignored in the belief that “it will probably be fine.”
Another factor is the temptation to prioritise loyalty over suitability. In insurgent parties, enthusiasm is currency. Candidates who are vocal, combative, and unwavering in their support for the leadership are often rewarded, even if they lack experience or judgement. Dissenters may be excluded, while loyalists are fast-tracked. This creates an echo chamber where warning signs are dismissed as disloyal criticism rather than legitimate concern.
The result is a fragile candidate slate—one that looks impressive in numbers but brittle under scrutiny. There is also a misunderstanding of what voters will tolerate. Some strategists convince themselves that supporters “don’t care” about controversies, that attacks on candidates will be dismissed as establishment smears. This misreads public sentiment. Voters may distrust institutions, but that does not mean they abandon standards altogether. In fact, many hold reform candidates to higher standards precisely because they claim to be different.
When a reform candidate is revealed to have made inflammatory comments, exaggerated credentials, or behaved unethically, it does more than damage that individual. It casts doubt on the entire project. Opponents seize the narrative, portraying the movement as reckless or unserious. Supporters become defensive, forced to justify the unjustifiable. The conversation shifts away from policy and toward damage control.
Perhaps most corrosive is the internal toll. Good candidates—capable, principled individuals drawn to reform out of genuine conviction—find themselves overshadowed by colleagues who should never have made it past the first interview. Morale suffers. Infighting increases. The movement begins to resemble the dysfunction it set out to replace.
Media coverage follows a familiar arc. Initial excitement gives way to scepticism. Profiles of “ordinary people taking on the system” are replaced by exposés and awkward interviews. Each new revelation is framed not as an isolated failure, but as part of a pattern. Eventually, the question becomes unavoidable: if a movement cannot vet its own candidates, how can it be trusted to govern?
It is important to note that poor vetting is not unique to reform movements.
Established parties have their own long histories of candidate scandals. The difference is that traditional parties can often absorb the damage. Their brands are entrenched, their voter bases broad, their institutional memory deep. Reform movements do not have that luxury. They live or die by credibility. And credibility, once lost, is extraordinarily difficult to regain.
Effective vetting does not require vast resources or intrusive surveillance.
It requires seriousness. Clear standards. Willingness to say no. It means understanding that every candidate is a reflection of the movement as a whole, not just a name on a ballot. It also means empowering local organisers to raise concerns without fear of reprisal—and listening when they do.
Most importantly, it requires leadership that values long-term trust over short-term expansion.
Standing fewer candidates is not a failure if those candidates are credible. Winning headlines is meaningless if it comes at the cost of legitimacy. Reform movements often speak, rightly, about accountability. They argue that those in power have escaped consequences for too long. But accountability begins at home. It begins with asking hard questions before opponents do. It begins with accepting that some supporters, however enthusiastic, are not fit for public office.
The electorate is not naïve. Voters can tell when mistakes are honest and when they are habitual. One poorly vetted candidate may be forgiven. A pattern of them suggests a deeper problem—one of judgement, culture, and seriousness. If reform movements are to mature into governing forces rather than protest vehicles, they must treat vetting not as an administrative burden but as a foundational responsibility. The gatekeepers cannot look away.
Because when they do, the entire project walks through the door with them—and the damage that follows is rarely confined to one candidate alone.
In the end, reform is not just about changing policies. It is about changing standards. And standards, once compromised at the point of selection, are almost impossible to restore later.
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